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LEXICOGRAPHIC CHOICE FUNCTIONS
ARTHUR VAN CAMP, GERT DE COOMAN, AND ENRIQUEMIRANDA
ABSTRACT. We investigate a generalisation of the coherent choice functions consid-
ered by Seidenfeld et al. (2010), by sticking to the convexity axiom but imposing no
Archimedeanity condition. We define our choice functions on vector spaces of options,
which allows us to incorporate as special cases both Seidenfeld et al.’s (2010) choice
functions on horse lotteries and sets of desirable gambles (Quaeghebeur, 2014), and
to investigate their connections.
We show that choice functions based on sets of desirable options (gambles) sat-
isfy Seidenfeld’s convexity axiom only for very particular types of sets of desirable op-
tions, which are in a one-to-one relationship with the lexicographic probabilities. We
call them lexicographic choice functions. Finally, we prove that these choice functions
can be used to determine themost conservative convex choice function associatedwith
a given binary relation.
1. INTRODUCTION
Since the publication of the seminal work of Arrow (1951) and Uzawa (1956), coher-
ent choice functions have been usedwidely as amodel of the rational behaviour of an in-
dividual or a group. In particular, Seidenfeld et al. (2010) established an axiomatisation
of coherent choice functions, generalising Rubin’s (1987) axioms to allow for incompa-
rability. Under this axiomatisation, they proved a representation theorem for coherent
choice functions in terms of probability-utility pairs: a choice function C satisfies their
coherence axioms if and only if there is some non-empty set S of probability-utility pairs
such that f ∈C(A) whenever the option f maximises p-expected u-utility over the set
of options A for some (p,u) in S.
Allowing for incomparability between options may often be of crucial importance.
Faced with a choice between two options, a subject may not have enough information
to establish a (strict or weak) preference of one over the other: the two options may
be incomparable. This will indeed typically be the case when the available information
is too vague or limited. It arises quite intuitively for group decisions, but also for deci-
sions made by a single subject, as was discussed quite thoroughly by Williams (1975),
Levi (1980), and Walley (1991), amongst many others. Allowing for incomparability lies
at the basis of a generalising approach to probability theory that is often referred to by
the term imprecise probabilities. It unifies a diversity of well-known uncertainty models,
including typically non-linear (or non-additive) functionals, credal sets, and sets of de-
sirable gambles; see the introductory bookbyAugustin et al. (2014) for a recent overview.
Among these, coherent sets of desirable gambles, as discussed by Quaeghebeur (2014),
are usually considered to constitute the most general and powerful type of model. Such
sets collect the gambles that a given subject considers strictly preferable to the status
quo.
Nevertheless, choice functions clearly lead to a still more general model than sets of
desirable gambles, because the former’s preferences are not necessarily completely de-
termined by the pair-wise comparisons between options that essentially constitute the
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latter. Thiswas of course already implicit in Seidenfeld et al.’s (2010)work, butwas inves-
tigated in detail in one of our recent papers (Van Camp et al., 2017), where we zoomed
in on the connections between choice functions, sets of desirable gambles, and indiffer-
ence.
In order to explore the connection between indifference and the strict preference
expressed by choice functions, we extended the above-mentioned axiomatisation by
Seidenfeld et al. (2010) to choice functions defined on vector spaces of options, rather
than convex sets of horse lotteries, and also let go of two of their axioms: (i) the Archi-
medean one, because it prevents choice functions from modelling the typically non-
Archimedean preferences captured by coherent sets of desirable gambles; and (ii) the
convexity axiom, because it turns out to be hard to reconcile with Walley–Sen maximal-
ity as a decision rule, something that is closely tied in with coherent sets of desirable
options (Troffaes, 2007). Although our alternative axiomatisation allows for more lee-
way, and for an easy comparison with the existing theory of sets of desirable gambles,
it also has the drawback of no longer forcing a Rubinesque representation theorem, or
in other words, of not leading to a strong belief structure (De Cooman, 2005). Such a
representation is nevertheless interesting, because it allows choice functions to be con-
structed using basic building blocks. In an earlier paper (Van Camp et al., 2017), we did
discuss a few interesting examples of special ‘representable’ choice functions, such as
the ones from a coherent set of desirable gambles via maximality, or those determined
by a set of probability measures via E-admissibility.
The goal of the present paper is twofold: to (i) further explore the connection of our
definition of choice functions with Seidenfeld et al.’s (2010); and to (ii) investigate in de-
tail the implications of Seidenfeld et al.’s (2010) convexity axiom in our context. We will
prove that, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, for those choice functions that are uniquely
determined by binary comparisons, convexity is equivalent to being representable by
means of a lexicographic probability measure. This is done by first establishing the im-
plications of convexity in terms of the binary comparisons associated with a choice
function, giving rise to what we will call lexicographic sets of desirable gambles. These
sets include as particular cases the so-called maximal and strictly desirable sets of de-
sirable gambles. Although in the particular case of binary possibility spaces these are
the only two possibilities, for more general spaces lexicographic sets of gambles allow
for a greater level of generality, as one would expect considering the above-mentioned
equivalence.
A consequence of our equivalence result is that we can consider infima of choice
functions associated with lexicographic probability measures, and in this manner sub-
sume the examples of E-admissibility and M-admissibility discussed in an earlier pa-
per (Van Camp et al., 2017). It will follow from the discussion that these infima also
satisfy the convexity axiom. As one particularly relevant application of these ideas, we
prove that the most conservative convex choice function associated with a binary pref-
erence relation can be obtained as the infimum of its dominating lexicographic choice
functions.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we recall the basics of coherent choice
functions on vector spaces of options as introduced in our earlier work (Van Camp et al.,
2015). We motivate our definitions by showing in Section 3 that they include in particu-
lar coherent choice functions on horse lotteries, considered by Seidenfeld et al.’s (2010),
and we discuss in some detail the connection between the rationality axioms consid-
ered by Seidenfeld et al. (2010) and ours.
As a particularly useful example, we discuss in Section 4 the choice functions that
are determined by binary comparisons. We have already shown before (Van Camp et al.,
2017) that this leads to the model of coherent sets of desirable gambles; here we study
the implications of including convexity as a rationality axiom.
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In Section 5, we motivate our definition of lexicographic choice functions and study
the properties of their associated binary preferences. We prove the connection with lex-
icographic probability systems and show that the infima of such choice functions can
be used when we want to determine the implications of imposing convexity and maxi-
mality. We conclude with some additional discussion in Section 6.
2. COHERENT CHOICE FUNCTIONS ON VECTOR SPACES
Consider a real vector space V provided with the vector addition + and scalar multi-
plication. We denote the additive identity by 0. For any subsets A1 and A2 of V and any
λ in R, we let λA1 ∶= {λu ∶ u ∈ A1} and A1+ A2 ∶= {u+ v ∶u ∈ A1 and v ∈ A2}.
Elements of V are intended as abstract representations of options amongst which a
subject can express his preferences, by specifying choice functions. Often, options will
be real-valued maps on some possibility space, interpreted as uncertain rewards—and
therefore also called gambles.More generally, they can be vector-valued gambles: vector-
valued maps on the possibility space. We will see further on that by using such vector-
valued gambles, we are able to include as a special case horse lotteries, the options con-
sidered for instance by Seidenfeld et al. (2010). Also, we have shown (Van Camp et al.,
2017) that indifference for choice functions can be studied efficiently by also allowing
equivalence classes of indifferent gambles as options; these yet again constitute a vector
space, where now the vectors cannot always be identified easily withmaps on some pos-
sibility space, or gambles. For these reasons, we allow in general any real vector space to
serve as an our set of (abstract) possible options. We will call such a real vector space an
option space.
We denote byQ(V) the set of all non-empty finite subsets of V , a strict subset of the
power set of V . When it is clear what option space V we are considering, wewill also use
the simpler notation Q. Elements A of Q are the option sets amongst which a subject
can choose his preferred options.
Definition 1. A choice function C on an option space V is a map
C ∶Q→Q∪{∅}∶A ↦C(A) such that C(A) ⊆ A .
We collect all the choice functions onV in C(V), often denoted as C when it is clear from
the context what the option space is.
The idea underlying this simple definition is that a choice function C selects the set
C(A) of ‘best’ options in the option set A . Our definition resembles the one commonly
used in the literature (Aizerman, 1985; Seidenfeld et al., 2010; Sen, 1977), except perhaps
for an also not entirely unusual restriction to finite option sets (He, 2012; Schwartz, 1972;
Sen, 1971).
Equivalently to a choice function C , we may consider its associated rejection func-
tion R , defined by R(A) ∶= A ∖C(A) for all A inQ. It returns the options R(A) that are
rejected—not selected—by C .
Another equivalent notion is that of a choice relation. Indeed, for any choice function
C—and therefore for any rejection function R—the associated choice relation is the bi-
nary relation ⊲ onQ (Seidenfeld et al., 2010, Section 3), defined by:
A1 ⊲ A2⇔ A1 ⊆R(A1∪ A2) for all A1 and A2 inQ. (1)
The intuition behind ⊲ is clear: A1 ⊲ A2 whenever every option in A1 is rejected when
presented with the options in A1∪ A2.
2.1. Useful basic definitions and notation. We call N the set of all (positive) integers,
R>0 the set of all (strictly) positive real numbers, and R≥0 ∶=R>0∪{0}.
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Given any subset A of an option space V , we define its positive hull posi(A) as the
set of all positive finite linear combinations of elements of A :
posi(A) ∶= {
n
∑
k=1
λkuk ∶n ∈N,λk ∈R>0,uk ∈ A} ⊆ V ,
and its convex hull CH(A) as the set of convex combinations of elements of A :
CH(A) ∶= {
n
∑
k=1
αkuk ∶ n ∈N,αk ∈R≥0,
n
∑
k=1
αk = 1,uk ∈ A} ⊆ posi(A) ⊆ V .
A subset A of V is called a convex cone if it is closed under positive finite linear com-
binations, i.e. if posi(A) = A . A convex coneK is called proper ifK∩−K = {0}.
With any proper convex cone K ⊆V , we can associate an ordering ⪯K on V , defined
for all u and v in V as follows:
u ⪯K v⇔ v −u ∈K.
We also write u ⪰K v for v ⪯K u. The ordering ⪯K is actually a vector ordering: it is a
partial order—reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive—that satisfies the following two
characteristic properties:
u1 ⪯K u2⇔ u1 + v ⪯K u2 + v ; (2)
u1 ⪯K u2⇔λu1 ⪯K λu2, , (3)
for all u1, u2 and v in V , and all λ in R>0. Observe, by the way, that as a consequence
u ⪯K v⇔ 0 ⪯K v −u⇔u− v ⪯K 0
for all u and v in V .
Conversely, given any vector ordering ⪯, the proper convex cone K from which it is
derived can always be retrieved by K = {u ∈ V ∶ u ⪰ 0}. When the abstract options are
gambles, ⪯ will typically be the point-wise order ≤, but it need not necessarily be.
Finally, with any vector ordering ⪯, we associate the strict partial ordering ≺ as fol-
lows:
u ≺ v⇔ (u ⪯ v and u ≠ v)⇔ v −u ∈K∖{0} for all u and v in V .
We call u positive if u ≻ 0, and collect all positive options in the convex cone V≻0 ∶=
K∖{0}.
From now on, we assume that V is an ordered vector space, with a generic but fixed
vector ordering ⪯K. We will refrain from explicitly mentioning the actual proper convex
coneK we are using, and simply write V to mean the ordered vector space, and use ⪯ as
a generic notation for the associated vector ordering.
2.2. Rationality axioms. We focus on a special class of choice functions, which we will
call coherent.
Definition 2. We call a choice function C on V coherent if for all A , A1 and A2 inQ, all
u and v in V , and all λ in R>0:
C1. C(A) ≠∅;
C2. if u ≺ v then {v} =C({u,v});
C3. a. if C(A2) ⊆ A2∖ A1 and A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ A then C(A) ⊆ A ∖ A1;
b. if C(A2) ⊆ A1 and A ⊆ A2∖ A1 then C(A2∖ A) ⊆ A1;
C4. a. if A1 ⊆C(A2) then λA1 ⊆C(λA2);
b. if A1 ⊆C(A2) then A1+{u} ⊆C(A2+{u});
We collect all the coherent choice functions on V in C¯(V), often denoted as C¯ when it is
clear from the context what the option space is.
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Parts C3a and C3b of Axiom C3 are respectively known as Sen’s condition α and Aizer-
man’s condition. They are more commonly written in terms of the rejection function as,
respectively:
(A1 ⊆R(A2) and A2 ⊆ A)⇒ A1 ⊆R(A), for all A ,A1,A2 inQ, (4)
and
(A1 ⊆R(A2) and A ⊆ A1)⇒ A1∖ A ⊆R(A2∖ A), for all A ,A1,A2 inQ. (5)
These axioms constitute a subset of the ones introduced by Seidenfeld et al. (2010),
duly translated from horse lotteries to our abstract options, which are more general as
we will show in Section 3 further on. In this respect, our notion of coherence is less
restrictive than theirs. On the other hand, our Axiom C2 is more restrictive the corre-
sponding one in Seidenfeld et al. (2010). This is necessary for the link between coherent
choice functions and coherent sets of desirable gambles we will establish in Section 4.
One axiom we omit from our coherence definition, is the Archimedean one. Typi-
cally the preference associated with coherent sets of desirable gambles does not have
the Archimedean property (Zaffalon andMiranda, 2015, Section 3), so letting go of this
axiom is necessary if we want to explore the connection with desirability.
The second axiom that we do not consider as necessary for coherence is what wewill
call the convexity axiom:
C5. if A ⊆ A1 ⊆CH(A) then C(A) ⊆C(A1), for all A and A1 inQ.
As we will show in Section 4, it is incompatible with Walley–Sen maximality (Walley,
1991; Troffaes, 2007) as a decision rule. Nevertheless, we intend to investigate the con-
nection with desirability for coherent choice functions that do satisfy the convexity ax-
iom.
Two dominance properties are immediate consequences of coherence:
Proposition 1. Let C be a coherent choice function onQ. Then for all u1 and u2 inV such
that u1 ⪯ u2, all A inQ and all v in A ∖{u1,u2}:
a. if u2 ∈ A and v ∉C(A ∪{u1}) then v ∉C(A);
b. if u1 ∈ A and v ∉C(A) then v ∉C({u2}∪ A ∖{u1}).
Proof. The result is trivial when u1 = u2, so let us assume that u1 ≺ u2.
The first statement is again trivial if u1 ∈ A . When u1 ∉ A , it follows from Axiom C2
that u1 ∉ C({u1,u2}). By applying Axiom C3a in the form of Equation (4), we find that
u1 ∉ C(A ∪{u1}), and then applying Axiom C3b in the form of Equation (5), together
with the assumption that v ∉ C(A ∪{u1}), we conclude that v ∉ C(A ∪{u1}∖{u1}) =
C(A).
For the second statement, it follows from Axiom C2 that u1 ∉ C({u1,u2}). By apply-
ing Axiom C3a in the form of Equation (4), we find that both u1 ∉ C(A ∪ {u2}) and
v ∉ C(A ∪{u2}), so we can apply Axiom C3b in the form of Equation (5) to conclude
that v ∉C({u2}∪ A ∖{u1}). 
We are interested in conservative reasoning with choice functions. We therefore in-
troduce a binary relation ⊑ on the set C of all choice functions, having the interpretation
of ‘not more informative than’, or, in other words, ‘at least as uninformative as’.
Definition3. Given two choice functionsC1 andC2 inC, we callC1 notmore informative
than C2—and we writeC1 ⊑ C2—if (∀A ∈Q)C1(A) ⊇C2(A).
This intuitive way of ordering choice functions is also used by Bradley (2015, Section 2)
and Van Camp et al. (2017, Definition 6). The underlying idea is that a choice function is
more informativewhen it consistently choosesmore specifically—ormore restrictively—
amongst the available options.
Since, by definition, ⊑ is a product ordering of set inclusions, the following result is
immediate (Davey and Priestley, 1990).
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Proposition 2. The structure (C;⊑) is a complete lattice:
(i) it is a partially ordered set, or poset, meaning that the binary relation ⊑ on C is
reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive;
(ii) for any subset C′ of C, its infimum infC′ and its supremum supC′ with respect to
the ordering ⊑ exist in C, and are given by infC′(A) =⋃C∈C′ C(A) and supC′(A) =
⋂C∈C′ C(A) for all A inQ.
The idea underlying these notions of infimum and supremum is that infC′ is the most
informative model that is not more informative than any of the models in C′, and supC′
the least informative model that is not less informative than any of the models in C′.
We have proved elsewhere (Van Camp et al., 2017, Proposition 3) that coherence is
preserved under arbitrary non-empty infima. Because of our interest in the additional
Axiom C5, we prove that it also is preserved under arbitrary non-empty infima.
Proposition 3. Given any non-empty collection C′ of choice functions that satisfy Ax-
iom C5, its infimum infC′ satisfies Axiom C5 as well.
Proof. Denote C ′ ∶= infC′. Consider any A and A1 inQ such that A ⊆ A1 ⊆CH(A). Then
C(A) ⊆C(A1) for all C in C′, whenceC ′(A) =⋃C∈C′ C(A) ⊆⋃C∈C′ C(A1) =C ′(A1). 
3. THE CONNECTION WITH OTHER DEFINITIONS OF CHOICE FUNCTIONS
Before we go on with our exploration of choice functions, let us take some time here
to explain why we have chosen to define them in the way we did. Seidenfeld et al. (2010)
(see also Kadane et al., 2004) define choice functions on horse lotteries, instead of op-
tions, as this helps them generalise the framework of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) for
binary preferences to non-binary ones.
One reason for our working with the more abstract notion of options—elements
of some general vector space—is that they are better suited for dealing with indiffer-
ence: this involves working with equivalence classes of options, which again constitute
a vector space (Van Camp et al., 2017). These equivalence classes can no longer be in-
terpreted easily or directly as gambles, or horse lotteries for that matter. Another reason
for using options that are more general than real-valued gambles is that recent work
by Zaffalon andMiranda (2015) has shown that a very general theory of binary prefer-
ence can be constructed using vector-valued gambles, rather than horse lotteries. Such
vector-valued gambles again constitute a real vector, or option, space. Here, we show
that the conclusions of their work can be extended from binary preferences to choice
functions.
We consider an arbitrary possibility spaceX ofmutually exclusive elementary events,
one of which is guaranteed to occur. Consider also a countable set R of prizes, or re-
wards.
Definition 4 (Gambles). Any bounded real-valued function on some domainX is called
a gamble onX . We collect all gambles onX inL(X), often denoted asLwhen it is clear
from the context what the domainX is.
When the domain is of the typeX ×R, we call elements f ofL(X ×R) vector-valued
gambles onX . Indeed, for each x inX , the partial map f (x, ⋅) is then an element of the
vector space L(R).
The set L, provided with the point-wise addition of gambles, the point-wise multipli-
cation with real scalars, and the point-wise vector ordering ≤, constitutes an ordered
vector space. We callL>0 ∶= { f ∈ L ∶ f > 0} = { f ∈ L ∶ f ≥ 0 and f ≠ 0} the set of all positive
(vector-valued) gambles.
Horse lotteries are special vector-valued gambles.
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Definition 5 (Horse lotteries). We call horse lottery H anymap fromX ×R to [0,1] such
that for all x inX , the partial map H(x, ⋅) is a probability mass function overR:
(∀x ∈X )(∑
r∈R
H(x,r ) = 1 and (∀r ∈R)H(x,r ) ≥ 0).
We collect all the horse lotteries on X with reward setR inH(X ,R), which is also de-
noted more simply byH when it is clear from the context what the possibility space X
and reward setR are.
Let us, for the remainder of this section, fix X andR. It is clear that H ⊆ L(X ×R).
Seidenfeld et al. (2010) consider choice functions whose domain isQ(H), the set of all
finite subsets ofH—choice functions on horse lotteries.1 We will call them choice func-
tions on H. Because of the nature of H, their choice functions are different from ours:
they require slightly different rationality axioms. The most significant change is that for
Seidenfeld et al. (2010), choice functions need not satisfy Axioms C4a and C4b. In fact,
choice functions onH cannot satisfy these axioms, sinceH is no linear space: it is not
closed under arbitrary linear combinations, only under convex combinations. Instead,
on their approach a choice function C∗ onH is required to satisfy
C∗4 . A
∗
1 ⊲C∗ A∗2 ⇔αA∗1 +(1−α){H} ⊲C∗ αA∗2 +(1−α){H} for all α in (0,1], all A∗1 and
A∗2 inQ(H) and all H inH.
Thebinary relation⊲C∗ is the choice relation associatedwithC∗ , definedby Equation (1).
Furthermore, for a choice functionC∗ to be coherent, it needs to additionally satisfy (see
(Seidenfeld et al., 2010)):
C∗1 . C
∗(A∗) ≠∅ for all A∗ inQ(H);
C∗2 . for all A
∗ in Q(H), all H1 and H2 in H such that H1(⋅,⊺) ⪯ H2(⋅,⊺) and H1(⋅,r ) =
H2(⋅,r ) = 0 for all r inR∖{,⊺}, and all H inH∖{H1,H2}:
a. if H2 ∈ A∗ and H ∈ R∗({H1}∪ A∗) then H ∈R∗(A∗);
b. if H1 ∈ A∗ and H ∈ R∗(A∗) then H ∈R∗({H2}∪ A∗∖{H1});
C∗3 . for all A
∗, A∗1 and A
∗
2 inQ(H):
a. if A∗1 ⊆R∗(A∗2 ) and A∗2 ⊆ A∗ then A∗1 ⊆R∗(A);
b. if A∗1 ⊆R∗(A∗2 ) and A∗ ⊆ A∗1 then A∗1 ∖ A∗ ⊆R∗(A∗2 ∖ A);
C∗5 . if A
∗ ⊆ A∗1 ⊆CH(A) then C∗(A) ⊆C∗(A∗1 ), for all A∗ and A∗1 inQ(H);
C∗6 . for all A
∗, A∗
′
, A∗
′′
A∗i
′
and A∗i
′′
(for i in N) in Q(H) such that the sequence A∗i ′
converges point-wise to A∗
′
and the sequence A∗i
′′
converges point-wise to A∗
′′
:
a. If (∀i ∈N)A∗i ′′ ⊲C∗ A∗i ′ and A∗′ ⊲C∗ A∗ then A∗′′ ⊲C∗ A∗;
b. If (∀i ∈N)A∗i ′′ ⊲C∗ A∗i ′ and A∗ ⊲C∗ A∗′′ then A∗ ⊲C∗ A∗′,
where Seidenfeld et al. (2010) assume that there is a a unique worst reward  and a
unique best reward ⊺ inR. This is a somewhat stronger assumption than we will make:
further on in this section, we will only assume that there is a unique worst reward. Ax-
iomC∗2 is the counterpart of Proposition 1 for choice functions on horse lotteries, which
is a result of our Axioms C1–C4. Seidenfeld et al. (2010) need to impose this property as
an axiom, essentially because of the absence in their system of a counterpart for our
Axiom C2. Axioms C
∗
6 a and C
∗
6b are Archimedean axioms, hard to reconcile with desir-
ability (see for instance Zaffalon andMiranda, 2015, Section 4), which is why will not
enforce them here.
Wenow intend to show that under very weak conditions on the rewards setR, choice
functions on horse lotteries that satisfy C∗4 are in a one-to-one correspondence with
choice functions on a suitably defined option space that satisfy Axioms C4a and C4b.
1Actually, Seidenfeld et al. (2010) define choice functions on a larger domain: all possibly infinite but
closed sets of horse lotteries (non-closed sets may not have admissible options). This is a complication we
see no need for in the present context.
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Let us first study the impact of AxiomC∗4 . We begin by showing that an assessment of
H ∈C(A) for some A inQ(H) implies other assessments of this type.
Proposition 4. Consider any choice function C∗ on Q(H) that satisfies Axiom C∗4 , any
option sets A∗ and A∗
′
inQ(H), and any H in A∗ and H ′ in A∗′. If there are λ and λ′ in
R>0 such that λ(A∗−{H}) =λ′(A∗′−{H ′}), then
H ∈C∗(A)⇔H ′ ∈C∗(A∗′).
Proof. Fix A∗ and A∗
′
in Q(H), H in A∗ and H ′ in A∗′, λ and λ′ in R>0, and assume
that λ(A∗−{H}) = λ′(A∗′ −{H ′}). We will show that H ∈ R∗(A∗)⇔H ′ ∈ R∗(A∗′). We
infer from the assumption that
λ
λ+λ′
A∗+
λ′
λ+λ′
{H ′} = λ′
λ+λ′
A∗
′
+
λ
λ+λ′
{H}.
If we call α ∶= λ
λ+λ′
to ease the notation along, then 1−α = λ′
λ+λ′
and α ∈ (0,1). We now
infer from the identity above that αA∗+(1−α){H ′} = (1−α)A∗′+α{H}. Consider the
following chain of equivalences:
H ∈R∗(A∗)⇔ {H} ⊲C∗ A∗ by Equation (1)
⇔α{H}+(1−α){H ′} ⊲C∗ αA∗+(1−α){H ′} using Axiom C∗4
⇔α{H}+(1−α){H ′} ⊲C∗ (1−α)A∗′+α{H}
⇔ {H ′} ⊲C∗ A∗′ using Axiom C∗4
⇔H ′ ∈R∗(A∗′) by Equation (1). 
For any r inR, we now introduceRr ∶=R∖{r}, the set of all rewards without r . For
the connection between choice functions on H and choice functions on some option
space, we need to somehow be able to extendH to a linear space. The so-called gambli-
fier ϕr will play a crucial role in this:
Definition 6 (Gamblifier ϕr ). Consider any r inR. The gamblifier ϕr is the linear map
ϕr ∶L(X ×R)→L(X ×Rr )∶ f ↦ϕr f ,
where ϕr f (x, s) ∶= f (x, s) for all x inX and s inRr .
In particular, the gamblifierϕr maps any horse lotteryH inH(X ,R) to an element ϕrH
of L(X ×Rr ) that satisfies the following two conditions:
ϕrH(⋅, ⋅) ≥ 0 and ∑
s∈Rr
ϕrH(⋅, s) ≤ 1. (6)
Application of ϕr to sets of the form λ(A∗ − {H}) essentially leaves the ‘information’
they contain unchanged:
Lemma 5. Consider any r inR. Then the following two properties hold:
(i) The gamblifierϕr is one-to-one onH.
(ii) For any A∗ and A∗
′
inQ(H), any H in A∗ and H ′ in A∗′ and any λ and λ′ in R>0:
λ(A∗−{H}) =λ′(A∗′−{H ′})⇔ϕr (λ(A∗−{H})) =ϕr (λ′(A∗′−{H ′}))
Proof. We begin with the first statement. Consider any H and H ′ inH, and assume that
ϕr (H) =ϕr (H ′). We infer fromDefinition 6 that
H(x, s) =H ′(x, s) for all x inX and s inRr ,
and therefore also, since H and H ′ are horse lotteries,
H(x,r ) = 1− ∑
s∈Rr
H(x, s) = 1− ∑
s∈Rr
H ′(x, s) =H ′(x,r ) for all x inX .
Hence indeed H =H ′.
LEXICOGRAPHIC CHOICE FUNCTIONS 9
The direct implication in the second statement is trivial; let us prove the converse.
Assume that ϕr (λ(A∗ − {H})) = ϕr (λ′(A∗′ − {H ′})). We may write, without loss of
generality, that A = {H,H1, . . . ,Hn} and A∗′ = {H ′,H ′1, . . . ,H ′m} for some n and m in N.
Now, consider any element Hi in A
∗, then ϕr (λ(Hi −H)) ∈ϕr (λ(A∗−{H})). Consider
any j in {1, . . . ,m} such that ϕr (λ(Hi −H)) = ϕr (λ′(H ′j −H ′)). It follows from the as-
sumption that there is at least one such j . The proof is complete if we can show that
λ(Hi −H) =λ′(H ′j −H ′). By Definition 6, we already know that
λ(Hi (⋅, s)−H(⋅, s)) =λ′(H ′j (⋅, s)−H ′(⋅, s)) for all s inRr ,
and therefore, since H, H ′, Hi and H
′
j are horse lotteries, also
λ(Hi (⋅,r )−H(⋅,r )) =λ( ∑
s∈Rr
H(⋅, s)− ∑
s∈Rr
Hi (⋅, s)) = ∑
s∈Rr
λ(H(⋅, s)−Hi (⋅, s))
= ∑
s∈Rr
λ′(H ′(⋅, s)−H ′j (⋅, s)) =λ′( ∑
s∈Rr
H ′(⋅, s)− ∑
s∈Rr
H ′j (⋅, s))
=λ′(H ′j (⋅,r )−H ′(⋅,r )),
whence indeed λ(Hi −H) =λ′(H ′j −H ′). 
We now lift the gamblifier ϕr to a map ϕ˜r that turns choice functions on gambles into
choice functions on horse lotteries:
ϕ˜r ∶C(L(X ×Rr ))→ C(H(X ,R))∶C ↦ ϕ˜rC , (7)
where ϕ˜rC(A∗) ∶= ϕ−1r C(ϕr A∗) for every A∗ in Q(H(X ,R)). This definition makes
sense because we have proved in Lemma 5 that ϕr is one-to-one on H, and therefore
invertible on ϕrH. The result of applying ϕ˜r to a choice function C on L(X ×Rr ) is a
choice function ϕ˜rC on H(X ,R). Observe that we can equally well make ϕ˜r apply to
rejection functions R , and that for every A∗ inQ(H(X ,R)):
ϕ˜rR(A∗) ∶=ϕ−1r R(ϕr A∗) =ϕ−1r (ϕr A∗∖C(ϕr A∗)) = A∗∖ϕ−1r C(ϕr A∗) = A∗∖ ϕ˜rC(A∗),
so ϕ˜rR is the rejection function associated with the choice function ϕ˜rC , when R is the
rejection function for C .
One property of the transformation ϕ˜r that will be useful in our subsequent proofs is
the following:
Lemma 6. Consider any r inR and any A inQ(L(X ×Rr )), and define g by g(x, s) ∶=
∑ f ∈A ∣ f (x, s)∣ for all x in X and s inRr . Consider any λ in R such that
λ >max{max
x∈X
∑
s∈Rr
h(x, s) ∶ h ∈ A+{g}} ≥ 0.
Then 1
λ
(A +{g}) =ϕr A∗ for some A∗ inQ(H(X ,R)).
Proof. Consider any h in A + {g}, and let us show that 1
λ
h satisfies the conditions in
Equation (6). The first one is satisfied because λ > 0 and h = f +g for some f in A , so h =
f + g = f +∑ f ′∈A ∣ f ′∣ ≥ f + ∣ f ∣ ≥ 0 and therefore indeed 1λh ≥ 0. For the second condition,
recall that λ ≥∑s∈Rr h(⋅, s) by construction and therefore indeed∑s∈Rr 1λh(⋅, s) ≤ 1. 
Proposition 7. Consider any r in R. The operator ϕ˜r is one-to-one on the choice func-
tions on L(X ×Rr ) that satisfy Axioms C4a and C4b.
Proof. Assume ex absurdo that ϕ˜r is not one-to-one, so there are choice functionsC and
C ′ onL(X×Rr ) that satisfy AxiomsC4a andC4b, such that ϕ˜rC = ϕ˜rC ′ but nevertheless
C ≠C ′. The lattermeans that there are A inQ(L(X×Rr )) and f in A such that f ∈C(A)
and f ∉C ′(A). Use Lemma 6 to find some λ in R>0 and g in L(X ×Rr ) such that 1λ(A+{g}) =ϕr A∗ for some A∗ inQ(H(X ,R)). If we now apply Axioms C4a and C4b we find
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that
f +g
λ
∈C( 1
λ
(A +{g})), or equivalently, ϕ−1r ( f +gλ ) ∈ ϕ˜rC(A∗). Similarly, we find that
f +g
λ
∉ C ′( 1
λ
(A +{g})), or equivalently, ϕ−1r ( f +gλ ) ∉ ϕ˜rC ′(A∗). But this contradicts our
assumption that ϕ˜rC = ϕ˜rC ′. 
Specifying a choice function C∗ onH induces a strict preference relation on the re-
ward set, as follows. With any reward r inR we can associate the constant and degener-
ate lottery Hr by letting
Hr (x, s) ∶={1 if s = r
0 otherwise
for all x inX and s inR. (8)
This is the lottery that associates the certain reward r with all states. Then a reward r is
strictly preferred to a reward s when Hs ∈R∗({Hr ,Hs}).
Definition 7 (C∗ has worst reward r ). Consider any reward r inR, and any choice func-
tion C∗ onH(X ,R). We say that C∗ has worst reward r if r is the unique reward inR
for which Hr ∈ R∗({H,Hr }) for all H inH(X ,R)∖{Hr }.
The notion of having worst reward is closely related with what would be the natural
translation of Axiom C2 to choice functions C
∗ onH(X ,R): if C∗ satisfies
(∀H1,H2 ∈H)((H1 ≠H2 and (∀s ∈Rr )(H1(⋅, s) ≤H2(⋅, s)))⇒H1 ∈R∗({H1,H2}))
(9)
for some r inR, then we say that C∗ satisfies the dominance relation for worst reward r .
Proposition 8. Consider any r inR and any choice function C onL(X ×Rr ). Then ϕ˜rC
satisfies the dominance relation for worst reward r (Equation (9)) if and only if ϕ˜rC has
worst reward r .
Proof. For the direct implication, consider any H in H(X ,R)∖ {Hr }. Then Hr (⋅, s) =
0 ≤H(⋅, s) for all s inRr , and also H ≠Hr , whence indeed Hr ∈ ϕ˜rR({H,Hr }), because
by assumption ϕ˜rC satisfies Equation (9) for r .
For the converse implication, consider any H1 and H2 in H(X ,R) such that H1 ≠
H2 and H1(⋅, s) ≤ H2(⋅, s) for all s in Rr . Then ϕrH1 < ϕrH2, whence 0 < ϕr (H2 −H1).
Observe that for the horse lottery H ′ inH(X ,R) defined by
H ′(⋅, s) ∶={H2(⋅, s)−H1(⋅, s) if s ∈Rr
1−∑s∈Rr (H2(⋅, s)−H1(⋅, s)) if s = r ,
we have that ϕrH
′ = ϕr (H2 −H1). Because ϕ˜rC is assumed to have worst reward r ,
we know that in particular Hr ∈ ϕ˜rR({H ′,Hr }), so we infer from Equation (7) that 0 =
ϕrHr ∈R({ϕrHr ,ϕrH ′}) =R({0,ϕrH2−ϕrH1}). NowuseAxiomC4b to infer thatϕrH1 ∈
R({ϕrH1,ϕrH2}), whence indeed H1 ∈ ϕ˜rR({H1,H2}), by Equation (7). 
Applying the lifting ϕ˜r furthermore preserves coherence:
Theorem9. Consider any reward r inR, and any choice function C on L(X ×Rr ) that
satisfies Axioms C4a and C4b. Then the following statements hold:
(i) C satisfies Axiom C1 if and only if ϕ˜rC satisfies Axiom C
∗
1 ;
(ii) C satisfies Axiom C2 if and only if ϕ˜rC has worst reward r ;
(iii) C satisfies Axiom C3a if and only if ϕ˜rC satisfies Axiom C
∗
3 a;
(iv) C satisfies Axiom C3b if and only if ϕ˜rC satisfies Axiom C
∗
3b;
(v) ϕ˜rC satisfies Axiom C
∗
4 ;
(vi) C satisfies Axiom C5 if and only if ϕ˜rC satisfies Axiom C
∗
5 .
Proof. For the direct implication of (i), assume that C satisfies Axiom C1. Consider any
A∗ inQ(H(X ,R)). Then ϕ˜rC(A∗) =ϕ−1r C(ϕr A) ≠∅.
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For the converse implication, assume that ϕ˜rC satisfies Axiom C
∗
1 . Consider any A
inQ(L(X ×Rr )). By Lemma 6, there are λ in R>0 and g in L(X ×Rr ) such that 1λ(A+{g}) = ϕr A∗ for some A∗ in Q(H(X ,R)). Applying Axioms C4a and C4b and the defi-
nition of ϕ˜ [Equation (7)], we infer that indeed
C(A) =λC( 1
λ
(A +{g}))−{g}=λC(ϕr A∗)−{g} =λϕr ϕ˜rC(A∗)−{g}≠∅.
For the direct implication of (ii), assume that C satisfies Axiom C2. Consider any H1
andH2 inH(X ,R) such thatH1 ≠H2 and H1(⋅, s) ≤H2(⋅, s) for all s inRr . Then ϕrH1 <
ϕrH2, so Axiom C2 guarantees that ϕrH1 ∈ R({ϕrH1,ϕrH2}). Equation (7) now turns
this into H1 ∈ ϕ˜rR({H1,H2}). Proposition 8 now tells us that ϕ˜rC has worst reward r .
For the converse implication, assume that ϕ˜rC has worst reward r . Consider any f1
and f2 inL(X ×Rr ) such that f1 < f2. Let
λ ∶=max
x∈X
∑
s∈Rr
( f2(x, s)− f1(x, s)) > 0.
Then clearly 1
λ
( f2 − f1) =ϕrH for some H inH(X ,R). Also, H ≠Hr because f1 ≠ f2. Us-
ing the assumption that ϕ˜rC has worst reward r , we find that then Hr ∈ ϕ˜rR({Hr ,H}).
As a consequence, by Equation (7), we find that 0 = ϕrHr ∈ R({0,ϕrH}) = R(0, 1λ( f2 −
f1)). Using AxiomC4a we infer that 0 ∈R({0, f2− f1}), and using AxiomC4b that indeed
f1 ∈R({ f1, f2}).
For the direct implication of (iii), assume that C satisfies Axiom C3a. Consider any
A∗, A∗1 and A
∗
2 in Q(H(X ,R)) and assume that A∗1 ⊆ ϕ˜rR(A2∗) and A∗2 ⊆ A∗. Then
ϕr A
∗
1 ⊆ R(ϕr A∗2 ) by Equation (7), and ϕr A∗1 ⊆ ϕr A∗. Use version (4) of Axiom C3a to
infer that then ϕr A
∗
1 ⊆R(ϕr A∗), whence indeed A∗1 ⊆ ϕ˜rR(A∗) by Equation (7).
For the converse implication, assume that ϕ˜rC satisfies Axiom C
∗
3 a. Consider any A ,
A1 and A2 in L(X ×Rr ) and assume that A1 ⊆ R(A2) and A2 ⊆ A . Use Lemma 6 to find
λ in R>0 and g in L(X ×Rr ) such that 1λ(A+{g}) =ϕr A∗ for some A∗ inQ(H(X ,R)).
Analogously, we find that 1
λ
(A2 +{g}) = ϕr (A∗2 ) for some A∗2 ⊆ A∗. A1 ⊆ R(A2) implies
A1 ⊆ A2, so also 1λ(A1 + {g}) = ϕr (A∗1 ) for some A∗1 ⊆ A∗2 . Using Axioms C4a and C4b,
we infer from the assumptions that 1
λ
(A1 +{g}) ⊆ R( 1λ(A2 +{g})), or in other words,
ϕr A
∗
1 ⊆ R(ϕr A∗2 ). Equation (7) then yields that A∗1 ⊆ ϕ˜rR(A∗2 ). As a result, using Ax-
iom C∗3 a, A
∗
1 ⊆ ϕ˜rR(A∗), which, again applying Equation (7), results in 1λ(A1 +{g}) =
ϕr A
∗
1 ⊆ R(ϕr A∗) = R( 1λ(A +{g})), and as a consequence, by Axioms C4a and C4b, we
find eventually that indeed A1 ⊆R(A).
For the direct implication of (iv), assume that C satisfies Axiom C3b. Consider any
A∗, A∗1 and A
∗
2 in Q(H(X ,R)) and assume that A∗1 ⊆ ϕ˜rR(A∗2 ) and A∗ ⊆ A∗1 . Then
ϕr A
∗
1 ⊆ R(ϕr A∗2 ) by Equation (7), and ϕr A∗ ⊆ ϕr A∗1 . Use version (5) of Axiom C3b to
infer that then ϕr (A∗1 ∖A∗) = (ϕr A∗1 )∖(ϕr A) ⊆R((ϕr A∗2 )∖(ϕr A∗)) =R(ϕr (A∗2 ∖A∗)),
whence indeed A∗1 ∖ A
∗ ⊆ ϕ˜rR(A∗2 ∖ A∗).
For the converse implication, assume that ϕ˜rC satisfies Axiom C
∗
3b. Consider any A ,
A1 and A2 in Q(L(X ×Rr )) and assume that A1 ⊆ R(A2) and A ⊆ A1. Use Lemma 6
to find λ in R>0 and g in L(X ×Rr ) such that 1λ(A2 + {g}) = ϕr A∗2 for some A∗2 inQ(H(X ,R)). A1 ⊆R(A2) implies A1 ⊆ A2, whence 1λ(A1+{g}) =ϕr (A∗1 ) for some A∗1 ⊆
A∗2 , and analogously,
1
λ
(A+{g}) =ϕr (A∗) for some A∗ ⊆ A∗1 . Using Axioms C4a andC4b
we find that 1
λ
(A1 +{g}) ⊆ R( 1λ(A2 +{g})), or in other words, ϕr A∗1 ⊆ R(ϕr A∗2 ). Equa-
tion (7) then tells us that A∗1 ⊆ ϕ˜rR(A∗2 ), which, using Axiom C∗3b, results in A∗1 ∖ A∗ ⊆
ϕ˜rR(A∗2 ∖ A∗). Again applying Equation (7) results in
1
λ
((A1∖ A)+{g}) = 1
λ
(A1+{g})∖ 1
λ
(A +{g}) = (ϕr A∗1 )∖(ϕr A∗) =ϕr (A∗1 ∖ A∗)
⊆R(ϕr (A∗2 ∖ A∗)) =R((ϕr A∗2 )∖(ϕr A∗))
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=R( 1
λ
(A2+{g})∖ 1
λ
(A +{g})) =R( 1
λ
((A2∖ A)+{g})),
and as a consequence, by Axioms C4a and C4b, we find eventually that indeed A1∖ A ⊆
R(A2∖ A).
For (v), consider any A∗1 and A
∗
2 in Q(H(X ,R)), any H in H(X ,R), and any α in(0,1]. Consider the following chain of equivalences
A∗1 ⊲ϕ˜rC A∗2
⇔ A∗1 ⊆ ϕ˜rR(A∗1 ∪ A∗2 ) by Equation (1)
⇔ϕr A∗1 ⊆R(ϕr (A∗1 ∪ A∗2 )) by Equation (7)
⇔ϕrαA∗1 ⊆R(ϕrα(A∗1 ∪ A∗2 )) by Axiom C4a
⇔ϕr (αA∗1 +(1−α){H}) ⊆R(ϕr (α(A∗1 ∪ A∗2 )+(1−α){H})) by Axiom C4b
⇔αA∗1 +(1−α){H} ⊆ ϕ˜rR(α(A∗1 ∪ A∗2 )+(1−α){H}) by Equation (7)
⇔ (αA∗1 +(1−α){H}) ⊲ϕ˜rC (αA∗2 +(1−α){H}) by Equation (1),
which tells us that ϕ˜rC satisfies Axiom C
∗
4 .
For the direct implication of (vi), assume that C satisfies Axiom C5. Consider any A
∗
and A∗1 in Q(H(X ,R)) and assume that A∗ ⊆ A∗1 ⊆ CH(A∗). Then ϕr A∗ ⊆ ϕr A∗1 ⊆
CH(ϕr A∗), whence C(ϕr A∗) ⊆ C(ϕr A∗1 ) by Axiom C5. Use Equation (7) to infer that
then indeed ϕ˜rC(A∗) ⊆ ϕ˜rC(A∗1 ).
For the converse implication, assume that ϕ˜rC satisfies Axiom C
∗
5 . Consider any A
and A1 in Q(L(X ×Rr )) and assume that A ⊆ A1 ⊆ CH(A). Use Lemma 6 to find λ in
R>0 and g in L(X ×Rr ) such that 1λ(A1 +{g}) = ϕr A∗1 for some A∗1 in Q(H(X ,R)) ,
and analogously, 1
λ
(A +{g}) = ϕr (A∗) for some A∗ ⊆ A∗1 . From A1 ⊆ CH(A) infer that
1
λ
(A1 +{g}) ⊆ CH( 1λ(A +{g})), or in other words, ϕr A∗1 ⊆ CH(ϕr A∗). Then we claim
that A∗1 ⊆ CH(A∗). To prove this, consider any H in A∗1 . Then there are n in N, Hi in A ,
and αi ≥ 0 such that∑ni=1αi = 1 and H(⋅, s) =∑ni=1αiHi (⋅, s) for all s inRr . Moreover,
H(⋅,r ) = 1− ∑
s∈Rr
H(⋅, s) = 1− ∑
r∈Rr
n
∑
i=1
αiHi (⋅, s)
= n∑
i=1
αi −
n
∑
i=1
αi ∑
r∈Rr
Hi (⋅, s) = n∑
i=1
αi(1− ∑
r∈Rr
Hi (⋅, s))= n∑
i=1
αiHi(⋅,r ),
so indeed H ∈ CH(A∗). Use Axiom C∗5 to infer that then ϕ˜rC(A∗) ⊆ ϕ˜rC(A∗1 ). Equa-
tion (7) turns this into C( 1
λ
(A +{g})) =C(ϕr A∗) ⊆C(ϕr A∗1 ) =C( 1λ(A1 +{g})), which
by Axioms C4a and C4b, results in C(A) ⊆C(A1). 
We conclude that our discussion of choice functions on linear spaces subsumes the
treatment of choice functions on horse lotteries satisfying Axiom C∗4 . Using the connec-
tions established above, all the results that we will prove later on are also applicable to
choice functions on horse lotteries that satisfy the corresponding rationality axioms.
4. THE LINK WITH DESIRABILITY
Van Camp et al. (2017) have studied in some detail how the coherent choice func-
tions in the sense of Definition 2 can be related to coherent sets of desirable options
(gambles). As an example, given a coherent set of desirable options D , the choice func-
tion that identifies the undominated—under the preference relation induced by D—
options, is coherent. This choice rule is calledmaximality (see Equation (12) further on).
There are other rules that induce coherent choice functions, such as E-admissibility—
those choice functions identify the options whose (precise) expectation is maximal for
at least one probability mass function in the credal set induced by D . Since we have
shown in earlier work (Van Camp et al., 2017, Proposition 13) that maximality leads to
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the most conservative coherent choice function that reflects the binary choices repre-
sented by D (see also Bradley, 2015, Theorem 3), we focus on maximality as the con-
nection between desirability and choice functions. Here, we investigate what remains
of this connection when we require in addition that our choice functions should satisfy
Axiom C5.
We recall that a set of desirable options is simply a subset of the vector space V . The
underlying idea is that a subject strictly prefers each option in this set to the status quo 0.
As for choice functions, we pay special attention to coherent sets of desirable options.
Definition 8. A set of desirable options D is called coherent if for all u and v in V , and
all λ in R>0:
D1. 0 ∉D ;
D2. V≻0 ⊆D ;
D3. if u ∈D then λu ∈D ;
D4. if u,v ∈D then u+ v ∈D .
We collect all coherent sets of desirable options in the set D¯.
More details can be found in a number of papers and books (Walley, 1991, 2000; Moral,
2005;Miranda and Zaffalon, 2010; Couso andMoral, 2011; de Cooman and Quaeghebeur,
2012; de Cooman andMiranda, 2012;Quaeghebeur, 2014;Quaeghebeur et al., 2015;De Bock and de Cooman,
2015).
Axioms D3 and D4 guarantee that a coherent D is a convex cone. This convex cone
induces a strict partial order ½D on V , by letting
u ½D v⇔ 0½D v −u⇔ v −u ∈D , (10)
so D = {u ∈ V ∶ 0 ½D u} (de Cooman and Quaeghebeur, 2012; Quaeghebeur, 2014). D
and ½D are mathematically equivalent: given one of D or ½D , we can determine the
other unequivocally using the formulas above. When it is clear from the context which
set of desirable options D we are working with, we often refrain from mentioning the
explicit reference to D in ½D and then we simply write ½. Coherence for sets of desir-
able options transfers to binary relations ½ as follows: ½ must be a strict partial order—
meaning that it is irreflexive and transitive—such that ≺ ⊆ ½, and must satisfy the two
characteristic properties of Equations (2) and (3).
What is the relationship between choice functions and sets of desirable options?
Since we have just seen that sets of desirable options represent binary preferences, we
see that we can associate a set of desirable options DC with every given choice function
C by focusing on its binary choices:
u ½DC v⇔ v −u ∈DC ⇔ u ∈R({u,v}) for all u,v in V . (11)
DC is a coherent set of desirable options ifC is a coherent choice function (Van Camp et al.,
2017, Proposition 12). Conversely (Van Camp et al., 2017, Proposition 13), if we start out
with a coherent set of desirable options D then the set {C ∈ C¯ ∶ DC = D} of all coher-
ent choice functions whose binary choices are represented by D , is non-empty, and its
smallest, or least informative, element CD ∶= inf{C ∈ C¯ ∶DC =D} is given by:
CD (A) ∶= {u ∈ A ∶ (∀v ∈ A)v −u ∉D} = {u ∈ A ∶ (∀v ∈ A)u /½ v} for all A inQ. (12)
It selects all options from A that are undominated, or maximal, under the ordering ½D ,
or in other words, it is the corresponding choice function based on Walley–Sen maxi-
mality. This CD is easy to characterise:
Proposition 10. Given any coherent set of desirable options D, then
0 ∈CD ({0}∪ A)⇔D ∩ A =∅ for all A inQ.
Proof. By Equation (12), 0 ∈ CD ({0}∪ A)⇔ (∀v ∈ {0}∪ A)v ∉ D ⇔ ({0}∪ A)∩D = ∅,
which is equivalent to A ∩D =∅, because 0 ∉D for any coherent D . 
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Although CD is coherent when D is, it does not necessarily satisfy the additional Ax-
iom C5, as the following counterexample shows.
Example 1. Consider the two-dimensional vector space V = R2. We provide it with the
component-wise vector ordering ⪯, and consider the vacuous set of desirable options
D = {u ∈ V ∶ u ≻ 0} = V≻0, which is coherent. By Proposition 10, 0 ∈CD ({0}∪ A)⇔ A ∩
V≻0 =∅ for all A inQ. To show thatCD does not satisfy Axiom C5, consider A = {0,u,v},
whereu ∶= (−1,2) and v ∶= (2,−1). We find that 0 ∈CD (A) because {u,v}∩V≻0 =∅, since
u ⊁ 0 and v ⊁ 0.
However, for the option set A1 = A ∪{u+v2 } ⊆CH(A), we find that u+v2 = (1/2,1/2) ≻ 0
and therefore 0 ∉CD (A1), meaning that Axiom C5 is not satisfied. ◊
For the specific coherent set of desirable options D considered in Example 1, the corre-
sponding choice functionCD fails to satisfy C5 . However, there are other sets of desirable
optionsD for whichCD does satisfy the convexity axiom. They are identified in the next
proposition.
Proposition 11. Consider any coherent set of desirable options D, then the corresponding
coherent choice function CD satisfies Axiom C5 if and only if D
c is a convex cone, or in
other words, if and only if posi(Dc) =Dc , or equivalently, posi(Dc)∩D =∅.
Proof. Van Camp et al. (2017, Proposition 13) have already shown that CD is a coherent
choice function.
For necessity, assume that posi(Dc) ≠ Dc , or equivalently, that posi(Dc)∩D ≠ ∅.
Then there is some option u in D such that u ∈ posi(Dc), meaning that there are n in N,
λk in R>0 and uk inD
c such that u =∑nk=1λkuk . Let A ∶= {0,u1 , . . . ,un} and A1 ∶= A∪{u}.
Due to the coherence of D [more precisely Axiom D3], we can rescale u ∈D while keep-
ing the uk fixed, in such a way that we achieve that∑
n
k=1λk = 1, whence A ⊆ A1 ⊆CH(A).
We find that 0 ∈ CD (A) by Proposition 10, because A ∩D = ∅, but 0 ∉ CD (A1) because
u ∈ D , so A1 ∩D ≠ ∅. This tells us that CD does not satisfy Axiom C5, because clearly
CD (A) ⊈CD (A1).
For sufficiency, assume that CD does not satisfy Axiom C5. Consider any A and A1
in Q for which A ⊆ A1 ⊆ CH(A). Then there is some u in A such that u ∈ CD (A) and
u ∉CD (A1). Due to Axiom C4b, we find that 0 ∈CD (A −{u}) and 0 ∉CD (A1 −{u}), or
equivalently, by Proposition 10, that A −{u} ⊆Dc and A1 −{u}∩D ≠∅. But A1 −{u} ⊆
CH(A)−{u} =CH(A −{u}) ⊆ posi(A −{u}) ⊆ posi(Dc), so posi(Dc)∩D ≠∅. 
This proposition seems to indicate that there is something special about coherent sets
of desirable options whose complement is a convex cone too. We give them a special
name that will be motivated and explained in the next section.
Definition 9. A coherent set of desirable options D is called lexicographic if
posi(Dc) =Dc , or, equivalently, if posi(Dc)∩D =∅.
We collect all the lexicographic coherent sets of desirable options in D¯L.
Another important subclass Dˆ of coherent sets of desirable options collects all the
maximally informative, ormaximal, ones:
Dˆ ∶= {D ∈ D¯ ∶ (∀D′ ∈ D¯)D ⊆D′⇒D =D′}.
The sets of desirable options in Dˆ are theundominated elements of the complete infimum-
semilattice (D¯,⊆). Couso andMoral (2011) have proved the following elegant and useful
characterisation of these maximal elements:
Proposition 12. Given any coherent set of desirable options D and any non-zero option
u ∉ D, then posi(D ∪ {−u}) is a coherent set of desirable options. As a consequence, a
coherent set of desirable options D is maximal if and only if
(∀u ∈ V ∖{0})(u ∈D or −u ∈D).
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De Cooman and Quaeghebeur (2012) have proved that the set of all coherent sets of de-
sirable options is dually atomic, meaning that that any coherent set of desirable options
D is the infimum of its non-empty set of dominatingmaximal coherent sets of desirable
options:
Proposition 13. For any coherent set of desirable options D, its set of dominating maxi-
mal coherent sets of desirable options DˆD ∶= {Dˆ ∈ Dˆ ∶D ⊆ Dˆ} is non-empty, andD =⋂DˆD .
Anymaximal coherent set of desirable options is also a lexicographic one: Dˆ ⊆ D¯L. To see
this, consider a maximal D and arbitrary n in N, uk in D
c and λk ∈R>0 for k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
Then since all −uk ∈D ∪{0} by Proposition 12, we infer that −∑nk=1λkuk ∈D ∪{0}, be-
cause the coherent D is in particular a convex cone. If∑nk=1λkuk = 0, then∑nk=1λkuk ∈
Dc by AxiomD1. If∑nk=1λkuk ≠ 0, then−∑nk=1λkuk ∈D , and coherence then guarantees
that, here too,∑nk=1λkuk ∈Dc . We conclude that Dc is indeed a convex cone.
5. LEXICOGRAPHIC CHOICE FUNCTIONS
In this section, we embark on amore detailed study of lexicographic sets of desirable
options, and amongst other things, explain where their name comes from. We will re-
strict ourselves here to the special case where V is the linear space L(X ) of all gambles
on a finite possibility space X , provided with the component-wise order ≤ as its vector
ordering.
We first show that the lower expectation functional associated with a lexicographic
D is actually a linear prevision (Walley, 1991; Troffaes and de Cooman, 2014).
Proposition 14. For any D in D¯L, the coherent lower prevision PD onL(X ) defined by
PD (f ) ∶= sup{µ ∈R ∶ f −µ ∈D} for all f inL(X )
is a linear prevision: a real linear functional that is positive—so (∀ f ≥ 0)PD ( f ) ≥ 0—and
normalised—meaning that PD (1) = 1.
Proof. Consider any f in L and ǫ in R>0, then we first prove that f ∈ D or ǫ− f ∈ D .
Assume ex absurdo that f ∉ D and ǫ− f ∉ D . Then, because by assumption posi(Dc) =
Dc is a convex cone, we also have that f + ǫ− f = ǫ ∉ D , which contradicts Axiom D2.
Now, Proposition 6 by Miranda and Zaffalon (2010) guarantees that for any such D , the
corresponding functional PD is indeed a linear prevision. 
To get some feeling for what these lexicographic models represent, we first look at
the special case of binary possibility spaces {a,b}, leading to a two-dimensional option
space V = L({a,b}) provided with the point-wise order. It turns out that lexicographic
sets of desirable options (gambles) are easy to characterise there, so we have a simple
expression for D¯L.
Proposition 15. All lexicographic coherent sets of desirable gambles on the binary possi-
bility space {a,b} are given by (see also Figure 1):
D¯L ∶= {Dρ ,Daρ ,Dbρ ∶ ρ ∈ (0,1)}∪{D0,D1} = {Dρ ∶ ρ ∈ (0,1)}∪ Dˆ,
where
Dρ ∶= {λ(ρ− I{a}) ∶λ ∈R}+V≻0 = span({ρ− I{a}})+V≻0 for all ρ in (0,1)
Daρ ∶=Dρ ∪{λ(ρ− I{a}) ∶λ ∈R<0} =Dρ ∪posi({I{a}−ρ}) for all ρ in (0,1)
Dbρ ∶=Dρ ∪{λ(ρ− I{a}) ∶λ ∈R>0} =Dρ ∪posi({ρ− I{a}}) for all ρ in (0,1).
D0 ∶= { f ∈ V ∶ f (a) > 0}∪V≻0
D1 ∶= { f ∈ V ∶ f (b) > 0}∪V≻0.
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Proof. We first observe that every set of desirable options in D¯L is coherent. Indeed, for
any ρ in (0,1), Dρ is the smallest coherent set of desirable gambles corresponding to
the linear prevision Ep , with p ∶= (ρ,1−ρ), while Daρ , Dbρ are maximal coherent sets of
desirable gambles corresponding to the same linear prevision Ep . Finally,D0 is themax-
imal (and only) coherent set of desirable gambles corresponding to Ep with p ∶= (0,1),
while D1 is the maximal (and only) coherent set of desirable gambles corresponding to
Ep with p ∶= (1,0).
We now prove that we recover all lexicographic coherent sets of desirable gambles in
this way. Consider any lexicographic coherent set of desirable gambles D∗. Then PD∗
is a linear prevision, by Proposition 14, so PD∗ is characterised (i) by the mass func-
tion (1,0), (ii) by the mass function (0,1), or (iii) by the mass function (ρ∗,1−ρ∗) for
some ρ∗ in (0,1). If (i), the only coherent set of desirable gambles that induces the linear
prevision with mass function (1,0) is D1 ∈ D¯L. If (ii), the only coherent set of desirable
gambles that induces the linear prevision with mass function (0,1) is D0 ∈ D¯L. If (iii),
there are only three coherent sets of desirable gambles that induce the linear prevision
with mass function (ρ∗,1−ρ∗):Dρ∗ ,Daρ∗ andDbρ∗ , and all are elements of D¯L. 
In the language of sets of desirable gambles (see for instance Quaeghebeur, 2014), this
means that in the binary case lexicographic sets of desirable gambles are eithermaximal
or strictly desirablewith respect to a linear prevision.
a
b
(ρ−1,ρ)
Dρ
a
b
(ρ−1,ρ)
Daρ
a
b
(ρ−1,ρ)
Dbρ
a
b
I{b} D0
a
b
I{a}
D1
FIGURE 1. The lexicographic coherent sets of desirable gambles on
the binary possibility space {a,b}, with ρ ∈ (0,1).
We now turn to the more general finite-dimensional case. Recall that a lexicographic
order <L with ℓ ∈N layers on a vector space V of finite dimension n is defined by
u <L v⇔ (∃k ∈ {1, . . . ,ℓ})(uk < vk and (∀ j ∈ {1, . . . ,k −1})u j = v j), (13)
and denote, as usual, its reflexive version ≤L as u ≤L v⇔ (u <L v or u = v) for any two
vectors u = (u1, . . . ,un) and v = (v1, . . . ,vn) in V . A lexicographic probability system is
an ℓ-tuple p ∶= (p1, . . . ,pℓ) of probability mass functions on a possibility space X of
cardinality n. We associate with this tuple p an expectation operator Ep ∶= (Ep1 , . . . ,Epℓ),
and a (strict) preference relation ≺p onL(X ), defined by:
f ≺p g⇔ Ep ( f ) <L Ep (g), for all f ,g in L(X ). (14)
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We refer to work by Blume et al. (1991), Fishburn (1982) and Seidenfeld et al. (1990) for
more details on generic lexicographic probability systems. The connection between lex-
icographic probability systems and sets of desirable gambles has also been studied by
Cozman (2015), and the connection with full conditional measures by Halpern (2010)
and Hammond (1994). Below, we first recall a number of relevant basic properties of
lexicographic orders in Propositions 17 and 18. We then provide a characterisation of
lexicographic sets of desirable gambles in terms of lexicographic orders in Theorem 20.
Remark that the reflexive version ⪯p of ≺p—defined by f ⪯p g⇔Ep ( f ) ≤L Ep (g) for
all f and g inL(X )—is a total order on L(X ) (Blume et al., 1991).
In what follows, we will restrict our attention to lexicographic probability systems p
that satisfy the following condition:
(∀x ∈X )(∃k ∈ {1, . . . ,ℓ})pk(x) > 0. (15)
This condition requires that there should be no possible outcome in X that has zero
probability in every layer. It is closely related to thenotionof a Savage-null event (Savage,
1972, Section 2.7):
Definition 10. An event B ⊆ X is called Savage-null if (∀ f ,g ∈ L(X ))IB f ⪯p IB g . The
event ∅ is always Savage-null, and is called the trivial Savage-null event.
An important feature of preference relations ≺p based on lexicographic probability
systems is the incomparability relation ∥p , defined by: f ∥p g if and only if f /≺p g and
g /≺p f for all f and g in L(X ). Since ⪯p is a total order, it follows that
f ∥p g⇔Ep ( f ) =Ep (g). (16)
Finally, it also follows that
f /≺p g⇔ g ≺p f or g ∥p f ⇔ Ep (g) ≤L Ep ( f ). (17)
Proposition 16. Consider any lexicographic probability system p = (p1, . . . ,pℓ). Then
Condition (15) holds if and only if there are no non-trivial Savage-null events.
Proof. For the direct implication, consider any lexicographic probability system p that
satisfies Condition (15), and consider any non-empty event B ⊆X . Consider any x in B ,
then IB ≥ I{x} so Epk (IB) ≥ Epk (I{x}) for every k ∈ {1, . . . ,ℓ}. Also, Ep (0) <L Ep (I{x}) by
Condition (15), so 0IB ≺p 1IB whence 1IB /⪯p 0IB and hence, by Definition 10, B is indeed
no Savage-null event.
For the converse implication, consider any lexicographic probability system p and as-
sume thatCondition (15) does not hold. Then there is some x∗ inX such that pk(x∗) = 0
for all k in {1, . . . ,ℓ}, and therefore Epk ( f I{x∗}) = 0= Epk (g I{x∗}) for all f and g inL(X )
and k in {1, . . . ,ℓ}, so Ep (f I{x∗}) = Ep (g I{x∗}) for all f and g inL(X ). This implies that
f I{x∗} ⪯p g I{x∗} for all f and g in L(X ), so indeed there is a non-trivial Savage-null
event {x∗}. 
Proposition 17. Consider any lexicographic probability system p with ℓ layers. Then ≺p
is a strict weak order, meaning that ≺p is irreflexive, and both ≺p and ∥p are transitive.
As a consequence, the relation /≺p is transitive as well.
Proof. This is a consequence of Equations (14), (16) and (17), taking into account that
<L and ≤L are transitive, and that <L is irreflexive. 
Wenow link the lexicographic orderings ≺p with the preference relation ½D based on
desirability, given by Equation (10). We begin with an auxiliary result:2
2Except for the second statement, most of the items in this propositions are well-known (Quaeghebeur,
2014, Section 1.4.1); we include a simple proof for completeness.
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Proposition 18. Consider any lexicographic probability system p with ℓ layers, and con-
sider any coherent set of desirable gambles D. Then ≺p and ½D are (strict) vector orders
compatible with ≺: they are irreflexive, transitive and
(i) f ≺p g⇔ f +h ≺p g +h⇔λ f ≺p λg ;
(ii) if there are no non-trivial Savage-null events, then f < g⇒ f ≺p g ;
(iii) f ½D g⇔ f +h ½D g +h⇔λ f ½D λg ;
(iv) f < g⇒ f ½D g ,
for all f , g and h inL(X ) and λ in R>0.
Proof. It is clear fromProposition 17 that ≺p is irreflexive and transitive. To show that½D
is irreflexive, infer from f − f = 0 ∉D [AxiomD1] that indeed f /½D f for all f inL(X ). To
show that ½D is transitive, assume that f ½D g and g ½D h. Then g − f ∈D and h−g ∈D ,
by Equation (10), and hence h− f = g − f +(h−g) ∈D , by AxiomD4. Using Equation (10)
again, we find that then indeed f ½D h. Let us now prove the remaining statements.
(i) This follows from the definition of ≺ and the linearity of the expectation operator.
(ii) Assume that there are no non-trivial Savage-null events. Use Proposition 16 to
infer that Condition (15) holds. Consider any f in L(X ) such that 0 < f . Then
0 ≤ f—so 0 ≤ Epk ( f ) for every k in {1, . . . ,ℓ}—and 0 < f (x∗) for some x∗ in X .
Then pk(x∗) > 0 for some k in {1, . . . ,ℓ} by Condition (15), so 0 <L Ep (I{x∗}). Use
f (x∗)I{x∗} ≤ f to infer that then also 0<L Ep (f ), whence indeed 0 ≺p f .
(iii) The first equivalence follows immediately from Equation (10), while the second is
a consequence of the scaling axiom of coherent sets of desirable options.
(iv) Assume that f < g . Then 0 < g − f , whence g − f ∈ D by Axiom D2. Using Equa-
tion (10), we find that then indeed f ½D g . 
Next we establish a link between lexicographic probability systems and preference
relations associated with lexicographic sets of desirable gambles. We refer to papers
by Cozman (2015, Section 2.1) and Seidenfeld et al. (1990) for other relevant discussion
on the connection between lexicographic probabilities and partial preference relations.
Our proof will make repeated use of the following separation theorem (Holmes, 1975),
in the form stated byWalley (1991, Appendix E1):
Theorem 19 (Separating hyperplane theorem). Let W1 and W2 be two convex subsets
of a finite-dimensional linear topological space B. If 0 ∈W1∩W2 and int(W1)∩W2 =∅,
then there is a non-zero continuous linear functional Λ on B such that
Λ(w) ≥ 0 for all w inW1 and Λ(w ′) ≤ 0 for all w ′ inW2.
If W1 andW2 are finite,W1 non-empty, and ∑mi=1λiwi −∑
n
k=1µkw
′
k ≠ 0 for all m and
n in N, all λ1, . . . , λm in R≥0 with λi > 0 for at least one i in {1, . . . ,m}, all µ1, . . . , µn in
R≥0, all w1, . . . , wm inW1, and all w ′1, . . . , w
′
n inW2, then there is a non-zero continuous
linear functional Λ on B such that
Λ(w) > 0 for all w inW1 and Λ(w ′) ≤ 0 for all w ′ inW2.
Two clarifications here are (i) that we will apply the theorem to linear subsets of L(X ),
which is a linear topological space (Walley, 1991, Appendix D) that is finite-dimensional
becauseX is finite, and (ii) that when the linear topological space is finite-dimensional,
the assumption int(W1) ≠ ∅ that Walley (1991, Appendix E1) mentions is not neces-
sary for the separating hyperplane theorem to hold, as shown by Holmes (1975, Theo-
rem 4B).
Theorem 20. Given a lexicographic probability system p = (p1, . . . ,pℓ) that has no non-
trivial Savage-null events, the set of desirable gambles Dp ∶= { f ∈ L(X ) ∶ 0 ≺p f } corre-
sponding with the preference relation ≺p , is an element of D¯L—a coherent and lexico-
graphic set of desirable gambles. Conversely, given a lexicographic set of desirable gam-
bles D in D¯L, its corresponding preference relation ½D is a preference relation based on
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some lexicographic probability system p = (p1, . . . ,pℓ) that has no non-trivial Savage-
null events.
Proof. We begin with the first statement. We first show that Dp is coherent. For Ax-
iomD1, infer from 0/≺p0 by the irreflexivity of ≺p [see Proposition 17] that indeed 0 ∉Dp .
For AxiomD2, consider any f inL>0. Use Proposition 18 to infer that 0≺p f , whence in-
deed f ∈Dp . For Axiom D3, consider any f in Dp and λ in R>0. Then 0 ≺p f , and hence
0 ≺p λ f using Proposition 18. Then indeed λ f ∈Dp . For AxiomD4, consider any f and g
inDp , whence 0 ≺p f and 0 ≺p g . From0 ≺p g infer that f ≺p f +g by Proposition 18, and
using 0 ≺p f , that 0 ≺p f + g by the transitivity of ≺p [see Proposition 17]. Then indeed
f + g ∈Dp .
So it only remains to show that posi(Dcp ) =Dcp . Consider any f and g in Dcp and any
λ1 and λ2 in R>0, then we must prove that λ1 f +λ2g ∈ Dcp . Since by assumption 0/≺p f
and 0/≺p g , Equation (17) guarantees that
Ep ( f ) ≤L Ep (0) = 0 and Ep (g) ≤L Ep (0).
By the linearity of the expectation operator,
Ep (λ1 f +λ2g)≤L Ep (0) = 0,
whence 0/≺pλ1 f +λ2g . Then indeed λ1 f +λ2g ∈Dcp .
For the second statement, we consider anyD in D¯L, andwe construct a lexicographic
probability system p with no non-trivial Savage-null events and such that ≺p equals ½D .
Define the real functional Λ1 on L(X ) by letting Λ1( f ) ∶= sup{α ∈ R ∶ f −α ∈ D} for
all f in L(X ). Proposition 14 guarantees that Λ1 is a linear functional. Its kernel kerΛ1
is an n−1-dimensional linear space, where n is the finite dimension of the real vector
spaceL(X )—the cardinality ofX . Since bothDc and kerΛ1 are convex cones, so is their
intersection Dc ∩kerΛ1, and it contains 0 because 0 ∈ Dc and 0 ∈ kerΛ1. Using similar
arguments, we see thatD ∩kerΛ1 is either a convex cone or empty. WhenD ∩kerΛ1 =∅,
let ℓ ∶= 1, and stop. When D ∩kerΛ1 ≠∅, it follows from Theorem 19 that there is some
non-zero (continuous) linear functional Λ2 on kerΛ1 such that
Λ2( f ) ≤ 0 for all f in Dc ∩kerΛ1 andΛ2( f ) ≥ 0 for all f in D ∩kerΛ1.
[Apply Theorem 19 with B = kerΛ1, W2 = Dc ∩ kerΛ1 and W1 = cl(D ∩ kerΛ1) (the
topological closure of D ∩kerΛ1 in kerΛ1); then int(W1)∩W2 = ∅ by Lemma 21, and
0 ∈W1∩W2] kerΛ2 is a n−2-dimensional linear space. Also,D∩kerΛ2 is either empty or
a non-empty convex cone. If it is empty, let ℓ ∶= 2; otherwise, we repeat the same proce-
dure again: it follows from Theorem 19 that there is some non-zero (continuous) linear
functional Λ3 on kerΛ2 such that
Λ3( f ) ≤ 0 for all f in Dc ∩kerΛ2 andΛ3( f ) ≥ 0 for all f in D ∩kerΛ2.
[Apply Theorem 19 with B = kerΛ2, W2 = Dc ∩ kerΛ2 and W1 = cl(D ∩ kerΛ2) (the
topological closure of D ∩kerΛ2 in kerΛ2); then int(W1)∩W2 = ∅ by Lemma 21, and
0 ∈W1 ∩W2] kerΛ3 is a n−3-dimensional linear space. Also, D ∩kerΛ3 is either empty
or a non-empty convex cone. If it is empty, let ℓ ∶= 3; if not, continue in the same vein.
This leads to successive linear functionals Λk defined on the n−k+1-dimenional linear
spaces kerΛk−1 such that
Λk( f ) ≤ 0 for all f inDc ∩kerΛk−1 andΛk( f ) ≥ 0 for all f in D ∩kerΛk−1. (18)
This sequence stops as soon as D ∩kerΛk =∅, and we then let ℓ ∶= k. Because the finite
dimensions of the successive kerΛk decrease with 1 at each step, we are guaranteed to
stop after atmost n repetitions: shouldD ∩kerΛk ≠∅ for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,n−1} then kerΛn
will be the 0-dimensional linear space {0}, and then necessarily D ∩kerΛn =∅. For the
last functional Λℓ, we have moreover that
Λℓ( f ) > 0 for all f in D ∩kerΛℓ−1. (19)
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To see this, recall that by construction Λℓ( f ) ≥ 0 for all f in D ∩kerΛℓ−1, and that D ∩
kerΛℓ =∅.
In this fashion we obtain ℓ linear functionals Λ1, . . . , Λℓ, each defined on the ker-
nel of the previous functional—except for the domain L(X ) of Λ1. We now show that
we can turn the Λ2, . . . , Λℓ into expectation operators: positive and normalised linear
functionals on the linear space L(X ). Indeed, consider their respective extensions Γ2,
. . . , Γℓ to L(X ) from Lemma 22 below, and let Γ1 ∶= Λ1. They satisfy Γk(1) > 0 for all
k ∈ {1, . . . ,ℓ}; see Proposition 14 and Lemma 22(ii). Now consider the real linear func-
tionals onL(X ) defined by E1 ∶=Γ1, and Ek( f ) ∶= Γk( f )/Γk(1) for all k in {2, . . . ,ℓ} and
f in L(X ). It is obvious from Proposition 14 and Lemma 22(i) that these linear func-
tionals are normalised and positive, and therefore expectation operators on L(X ). In-
deed each Ek is the expectation operator associated with the mass function pk defined
by pk(x) ∶= Ek(I{x}) for all x in X . In this way, p ∶= (p1, . . . ,pℓ) defines a lexicographic
probability system.
We now prove that p has no non-trivial Savage-null events, using Proposition 16. As-
sume ex absurdo that there is some x∗ in X such that pk(x∗) = Ek(I{x∗}) = 0 for all
k in {1, . . . ,ℓ}. Then I{x∗} ∈ kerΓ1 = kerΛ1 and I{x∗} ∈ Γk for all k in {2, . . . ,ℓ}. Invoke
Lemma 22(iii) to find that I{x∗} ∈ kerΛ1 ∩ kerΓ2 = kerΛ2. Repeated application of this
same lemma eventually leads us to conclude that in I{x∗} ∈ kerΛℓ−1 and I{x∗} ∈ kerΛℓ.
Since also I{x∗} ∈ D and hence I{x∗} ∈ D ∩ kerΛℓ−1 [Axiom D2], Equation (19) implies
that Λℓ(I{x∗}) > 0, a contradiction.
It now only remains to prove that ½D is the lexicographic orderingwith respect to this
lexicographic probability system, or in other words that
f ∈D⇔ 0 <L (E1(f ), . . . ,Eℓ( f )) for all f in L(X ).
For necessity, assume that f ∈D . Then E1( f ) ≥ 0 by the definition of Λ1. If E1( f ) > 0,
then we are done. So assume that E1( f ) = 0. Then f ∈ kerΛ1 and Λ2( f ) ≥ 0 by Equa-
tion (18). Again, if Λ2( f ) > 0, we can invoke Lemma 22(iv) to find that Γ2( f ) > 0 and
hence E2( f ) > 0, and we are done. So assume that Λ2( f ) = 0. Then f ∈ kerΛ2 and
Λ3( f ) ≥ 0 by Equation (18). We can go on in this way, and we call k the largest num-
ber for which E j ( f ) = 0 for all j in {1, . . . ,k −1}, or in other words, the smallest number
for which Ek( f ) > 0. Then k ≤ ℓ by construction—see Equation (19))—, whence indeed
0 <L (E1( f ), . . . ,Eℓ( f )).
For sufficiency, assume that 0 <L (E1( f ), . . . ,Eℓ(f )), meaning that there is some k in{1, . . . ,ℓ} for which E j ( f ) = 0 = Γ j (f ) for all j in {1, . . . ,k − 1} and Ek( f ) > 0, whence
also Γk( f ) > 0. So f ∈ kerΓ j for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,k −1} and therefore repeated application
of Lemma 22(iii) tells us that f ∈ kerΛ j for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,k −1}. Since Γk( f ) > 0, we infer
from Lemma 22(iv) that also Λk( f ) > 0, whence indeed f ∈D by Equation (18). 
Lemma 21. Consider any coherent set D of desirable gambles on a finite possibility space
X , and consider any linear subspaceΛ ⊆L(X ). Then int(cl(D ∩Λ))∩Dc =∅, where int
is the topological interior and cl the topological closure.
Proof. We first prove int(cl(D))∩Dc = ∅. To show that, we will use the fact that D ,
and therefore also cl(D), is a convex set. Since the interior of a convex set is always in-
cluded in the relative interior ri of that convex set (see Brøndsted, 1983, Section 1.3), we
find that int(cl(D)) ⊆ ri(cl(D)). A well-known result (Brøndsted, 1983, Theorem 3.4(d))
states that ri(cl(C)) = ri(C) for any convex set C in a finite-dimensional vector space,
whence int(cl(D)) ⊆ ri(D). But ri(D) is a subset of D , so int(cl(D)) ⊆ D , and hence
indeed int(cl(D))∩Dc =∅.
Now considerD∩Λ, a subset ofD . Since both cl and int respect set inclusion, we find
that int(cl(D ∩Λ)) ⊆ int(cl(D)) ⊆D , whence indeed int(cl(D ∩Λ))∩Dc =∅. 
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Lemma 22. Consider a non-zero real linear functional Λ1 on the n-dimensional real
vector space L(X ), and a sequence of non-zero real linear functionals Λk defined on the
n−k+1-dimensional real vector space kerΛk−1 for all k in {2, . . . ,ℓ}, where ℓ ∈ {2, . . . ,n}.
Assume that all Λk are positive in the sense that (∀ f ∈L≥0 ∩domΛk)(Λk( f ) ≥ 0), for all
k ∈ {1, . . . ,ℓ}. Then for each k in {2, . . . ,ℓ} the real linear functional Λk on kerΛk−1 can
be extended to a real linear functional Γk onL(X )with the following properties:
(i) For all f in L≥0: Γk( f ) ≥ 0;
(ii) Γk(1) > 0;
(iii) kerΓk ∩kerΛk−1 = kerΛk ;
(iv) For all f in kerΛk−1: Γk( f ) > 0⇔Λk( f ) > 0.
Proof. Fix any k in {2, . . . ,ℓ}. Since the real functional Λk on the n−k +1-dimensional
real vector space kerΛk−1 is non-zero, there is some hk in kerΛk−1 such thatΛk(hk) > 0.
We will consider the quotient space L(X )/kerΛk , a k-dimensional vector space whose
elements f /kerΛk = f +kerΛk are the affine subspaces through f , parallel to the sub-
space kerΛk , for f ∈L(X ). We first show that it follows from Theorem 19 that there is a
non-zero linear functional Γ˜k on L(X )/kerΛk such that
Γ˜k(u) ≤ 0 for all u inW2k ∶= {−I{x}/kerΛk ∶ x ∈Xk}, and
Γ˜k(u) > 0 for all u inW1k ∶= {hk/kerΛk}∪{I{x}/kerΛk ∶ x ∈Xk}, (20)
where we let Xk ∶= {x ∈ X ∶ I{x} ∉ kerΛk} ⊆ X . The set Xk is non-empty: since kerΛk
is n − k-dimensional, at most n − k of the linearly independent indicators I{x}, x ∈ X
may lie in kerΛk , so ∣Xk ∣ ≥ k. To show that we can apply Theorem 19, we prove that
the condition for it is satisfied: ∑ni=1λiw
1
i −∑
m
k=1µkw
2
k ≠ 0 for all m and n in N, all λ1,
. . . , λm in R≥0 with λi > 0 for at least one i in {1, . . . ,m}, all µ1, . . . , µn in R≥0, all w11 ,
. . . , w1n in W
1
k , and all w
2
1 , . . . , w
2
m in W
2
k . Since W
1
k and W
2
k are finite, it is not diffi-
cult to see that it suffices to consider∑ni=1λiw
1
i =λhk/kerΛk+∑x∈Xk λx I{x}/kerΛk and
∑mj=1µ jw
2
j =−∑x∈Xk µx I{x}/kerΛk . So assume ex absurdo thatλhk /kerΛk+∑x∈Xk (λx+
µx)I{x}/kerΛk = 0, or equivalently, that λhk +∑x∈Xk (λx + µx)I{x} ∈ kerΛk for some
µx ≥ 0, λx ≥ 0 and λ ≥ 0 for all x in Xk , where λ or at least one of {λx ∶ x ∈ Xk} are
positive. LetX ′k ∶= {x ∈Xk ∶ λx +µx > 0} and g ∶=∑x∈X ′k (λx +µx)I{x}, then we know that
λhk + g ∈ kerΛk .
There are now a number of possibilities. The first is that λ = 0, whence X ′k ≠ ∅ and
therefore g ∈ kerΛk ⊆ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⊆ kerΛ1. This implies that 0 =Λ1(g) =∑x∈X ′
k
(λx +µx)Λ1(I{x}).
Since all I{x} ≻ 0 andΛ1 is positive,wefind that I{x} ∈ kerΛ1 = domΛ2 for all x inX ′k . This
in turn allows us to conclude that 0 =Λ2(g) =∑x∈X ′
k
(λx +µx)Λ2(I{x}). Since all I{x} ≻ 0
and Λ2 is positive, we find that I{x} ∈ kerΛ2 = domΛ3 for all x in X ′k . We can go on in
this way until we eventually conclude that 0 = Λk(g) =∑x∈X ′
k
(λx +µx)Λk(I{x}). Since
all I{x} ≻ 0 andΛk is positive, we find that I{x} ∈ kerΛk for all x inX ′k , a contradiction.
The second possibility is that λ > 0. If nowX ′k =∅, we find that λhk ∈ kerΛk , whence
λΛk(hk) = 0, a contradiction. IfX ′k ≠∅, we find that λhk + g ∈ kerΛk ⊆ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⊆ kerΛ1. Since
hk ∈ kerΛk−1 ⊆ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⊆ kerΛ1, this implies that g ∈ kerΛk−1 ⊆ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⊆ kerΛ1 too. This implies
that 0 = Λ1(g) =∑x∈X ′
k
(λx +µx)Λ1(I{x}). Since all I{x} ≻ 0 and Λ1 is positive, we find
that I{x} ∈ kerΛ1 = domΛ2 for all x in X ′k . This in turn allows us to conclude that 0 =
Λ2(g) =∑x∈X ′
k
(λx +µx)Λ2(I{x}). Since all I{x} ≻ 0 andΛ2 is positive, we find that I{x} ∈
kerΛ2 = domΛ3 for all x in X ′k . We can go on in this way until we eventually conclude
that 0 =Λk−1(g) =∑x∈X ′
k
(λx +µx)Λk−1(I{x}). Since all I{x} ≻ 0 andΛk−1 is positive, we
find that I{x} ∈ kerΛk−1 = domΛk for all x in X ′k . This now allows us to rewrite λhk + g ∈
kerΛk as 0 = Λk(λhk + g) = λΛk(hk)+∑x∈X ′
k
(λx +µx)Λk(I{x}). Since all I{x} ≻ 0 and
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Λk is positive, this implies that λΛk(hk) ≤ 0, a contradiction. We conclude that, indeed,
there is a non-zero linear functional Γ˜k onL(X )/kerΛk that satisfies Equation (20).
We now define the new real linear functional Γk on L(X ) by letting
Γk( f ) ∶= Γ˜k( f /kerΛk) for all f in L(X ).
Observe that, since f =∑x∈X f (x)I{x}, this leads to
Γk( f ) = ∑
x∈X
f (x)Γ˜k(I{x}/kerΛk) = ∑
x∈Xk
f (x)Γ˜k(I{x}/kerΛk),
where the second equality follows from I{x} ∈ kerΛk , and therefore I{x}/kerΛk = 0, for
all x ∈X ∖Xk . If we also take into account Equation (20), this proves in particular that (i)
and (ii) hold.
For the rest of the proof, consider any f in kerΛk−1 and λ ∶= Λk( f )/Λk(hk), a well-
defined real number because Λk(hk) > 0. Then 0 =Λk( f )−λΛk(hk) =Λk( f −λhk), so
f −λhk ∈ kerΛk . As a result, f /kerΛk =λhk/kerΛk and thereforeΓk( f ) = Γ˜k( f /kerΛk) =
Γ˜k(λhk/kerΛk) =λΓ˜k(hk/kerΛk). Substituting back for λ, we get the equality:
Γk( f )Λk(hk) = Γ˜k(hk/kerΛk)Λk( f ).
Since both Λk(hk) > 0 and Γ˜k(hk/kerΛk) > 0 [by Equation (20)], we see that Γk( f )
and Λk( f ) are either both zero, both (strictly) positive, or both (strictly) negative. This
proves (iii) and (iv). 
We conclude that the sets of desirable options in D¯L are in a one-to-one correspon-
dence with the lexicographic probability systems that have no non-trivial Savage-null
events. This is, of course, the reason why we have called the coherent sets of desirable
options in D¯L ∶= {D ∈ D¯ ∶ posi(Dc) =Dc} lexicographic.
Lexicographic probability systems can now also be related to specific types of choice
functions, through Proposition 11: given a coherent set of desirable optionsD , the most
conservative coherent choice functionCD whosebinary choices are represented byDC =
D satisfies the convexity axiom C5 if and only if D is a lexicographic set of desirable op-
tions. We will call C¯L ∶= {CD ∶D ∈ D¯L} the set of lexicographic choice functions.
Looking first at the most conservative coherent choice function that corresponds to
D and then checking whether it is ‘convex’, leads rather restrictively to lexicographic
choice functions, and is only possible for lexicographic D : convexity and choice based
onWalley-Senmaximality are only compatible for lexicographic binary choice. But sup-
posewe turn things around somewhat, first restrict our attention to all ‘convex’ coherent
choice functions from the outset, and then look at the most conservative such choice
function that makes the same binary choices as present in some givenD :
inf{C ∈ C¯ ∶C satisfies Axiom C5 andDC =D}.
We infer from Proposition 3 that this infimum is still ‘convex’ and coherent. It will, of
course, no longer be lexicographic, unless D is. The following proposition tells us it still
is an infimum of lexicographic choice functions.
Proposition 23. Consider an arbitrary coherent set of desirable options D. The most con-
servative of all coherent choice function C that satisfies Axiom C5 and DC =D is the infi-
mum of all lexicographic choice functions CD′ with D
′ in D¯L such that D ⊆D′:
inf{C ∈ C¯ ∶C satisfies Axiom C5 and DC =D} = inf{CD′ ∶D′ ∈ D¯L and D ⊆D′}.
Proof. Denote the choice function on the left-hand side by Cleft, and the one on the
right-hand side by Cright. Both are coherent, and so by Axiom C4b completely charac-
terised by the option sets from which 0 is chosen. Consider any A in Q0, then we have
to show that 0 ∈Cleft({0}∪ A)⇔ 0 ∈Cright({0}∪ A).
For the direct implication, we assume that 0 ∈ Cleft({0}∪ A), meaning that there is
some C∗ in C¯ that satisfies Axiom C5, DC∗ = D and 0 ∈ C∗({0}∪ A). We have to prove
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that there is someD∗ in D¯L such thatD ⊆D∗ andD∗∩A =∅ [by Proposition 10], andwe
will do so by constructing a suitable lexicographic probability system, by a repeated ap-
plication of an appropriate version of the separating hyperplane theorem [Theorem 19],
as in the proof of Theorem 20.
To prepare for this, we prove that posi({0}∪ A)∩D =∅. Indeed, assume ex absurdo
that posi({0}∪A)∩D ≠∅, so there is some f ∈D such that f ∈ posi({0}∪A). Then there
is some λ inR>0 such that g ∶=λ f ∈CH({0}∪A). Let A′ ∶= A∪{g}, so {0}∪A′ ⊆CH({0}∪
A), whence 0 ∈ C∗({0}∪ A′) by Axiom C5, if we recall that 0 ∈ C∗({0}∪ A). But f ∈ D
implies that g ∈D , and since DC∗ =D , also that g ∈DC∗ , or equivalently, 0 ∈ R∗({0,g}),
by Proposition 10. Version (4) of Axiom C3a then guarantees that 0 ∈ R∗({0}∪ A′), a
contradiction.
It follows from this observation that we can apply Theorem 19 to show that there is
some non-zero linear functional Λ1 onL such that
Λ1( f ) ≤ 0 for all f in posi({0}∪ A) andΛ1( f ) ≥ 0 for all f in D . (21)
[Apply Theorem 19withB =L(X ),W2 = posi({0}∪A) andW1 =D∪{0}, then int(W1)∩
W2 = ∅ since int(W1) ⊆ D , and 0 ∈W1 ∩W2.] Its kernel kerΛ1 is an n −1-dimensional
linear space, where n is the dimension ofL(X )—the cardinality ofX . Since bothD and
kerΛ1 are convex cones, their intersection kerΛ1 ∩D is either empty or a convex cone.
When kerΛ1 ∩D =∅, we let ℓ ∶= 1, and stop.
When kerΛ1 ∩D ≠ ∅, it follows from the same version of the separating hyperplane
theorem that there is some non-zero linear functional Λ2 on kerΛ1 such that
Λ2( f ) ≤ 0 for all f in kerΛ1∩posi({0}∪ A) andΛ2( f ) ≥ 0 for all f in kerΛ1∩D .
[Apply Theorem 19 with B = kerΛ1,W2 = posi({0}∪A)∩kerΛ1 andW1 = (kerΛ1∩D)∪{0}, then int(W1)∩W2 =∅ sinceW2 ⊆posi({0}∪A) and int(W1) ⊆D , and 0 ∈W1∩W2.]
kerΛ2 is a n−2-dimensional linear space. As before,D ∩kerΛ2 is either empty or a non-
empty convex cone. If it is empty, let ℓ ∶= 2; otherwise, repeat the same procedure over
and over again, leading to successive non-zero linear functionals Λk on kerΛk−1 such
that
Λk( f ) ≤ 0 for all f in kerΛk−1∩posi({0}∪ A) andΛk( f ) ≥ 0 for all f in kerΛk−1∩D ,
(22)
until eventually we get to the first k such thatD ∩kerΛk =∅, and then let ℓ ∶= k and stop.
We are guaranteed to stop after at most n repetitions, since kerΛn is the 0-dimensional
linear space {0}, for which D ∩kerΛn =∅. For the last functional Λℓ, we have that
Λℓ( f ) > 0 for all f in D ∩kerΛℓ−1. (23)
To see this, recall that by construction Λℓ( f ) ≥ 0 for all f in D ∩kerΛℓ−1, and that D ∩
kerΛℓ =∅.
In this fashion we obtain ℓ linear functionals Λ1, . . . , Λℓ, each defined on the ker-
nel of the previous functional—except for the domain L(X ) of Λ1. We now show that
we can turn the Λ1, . . . , Λℓ into expectation operators: positive and normalised linear
functionals on the linear space L(X ). Indeed, consider their respective extensions Γ2,
. . . , Γℓ to L(X ) from Lemma 22, and let Γ1 ∶= Λ1. They satisfy Γk(1) > 0 for all k in{1, . . . ,ℓ}; see Proposition 14 and Lemma 22(ii). Now consider the real linear functionals
on L(X ) defined by Ek( f ) ∶= Γk( f )/Γk(1) for all k in {1, . . . ,ℓ} and f in L(X ). It is ob-
vious from Lemma 22(i) that these linear functionals are normalised and positive, and
therefore expectation operators on L(X ). Indeed each Ek is the expectation operator
associated with the mass function pk defined by pk(x) ∶= Ek(I{x}) for all x inX . In this
way, p ∶= (p1, . . . ,pℓ) defines a lexicographic probability system.
We now prove that p has no non-trivial Savage-null events, using Proposition 16. As-
sume ex absurdo that there is some x∗ in X such that pk(x∗) = Ek(I{x∗}) = 0 for all
k in {1, . . . ,ℓ}. Then I{x∗} ∈ kerΓ1 = kerΛ1 and I{x∗} ∈ Γk for all k in {2, . . . ,ℓ}. Invoke
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Lemma 22(iii) to find that I{x∗} ∈ kerΛ1 ∩ kerΓ2 = kerΛ2. Repeated application of this
same lemma eventually leads us to conclude that in I{x∗} ∈ kerΛℓ−1 and I{x∗} ∈ kerΛℓ.
Since also I{x∗} ∈ D and hence I{x∗} ∈ D ∩ kerΛℓ−1 [Axiom D2], Equation (23) implies
that Λℓ(I{x∗}) > 0, a contradiction.
If we now letD∗ ∶= { f ∈L(X ) ∶ 0 <L (E1( f ), . . . ,Eℓ( f ))}, thenD∗ ∈ D¯L by Theorem 20.
If we can show that D ⊆ D∗ and A ∩D∗ =∅, we are done. So first, consider any f in D .
Then Λ1( f ) ≥ 0 by Equation (21). If Λ1( f ) > 0 then also E1( f ) > 0 by Lemma 22(ii), and
therefore f ∈ D∗. If Λ1( f ) = 0 then Λ2( f ) ≥ 0 by Equation (22). If Λ2( f ) > 0 then also
E2( f ) > 0 by Lemma 22(ii)&(iv), and therefore f ∈D∗. We can go on in this way until we
get to the first k for which Λk( f ) > 0, and therefore also Ek( f ) > 0 by Lemma 22(ii)&(iv),
whence therefore f ∈ D∗. We are guaranteed to find such a k because we infer from
Equation (23) that Λℓ( f ) > 0. This shows that indeedD ⊆D∗.
Secondly, consider any f in A . Then Λ1( f ) ≤ 0 by Equation (21). If Λ1( f ) < 0 then
also E1( f ) < 0 by Lemma 22(ii), and therefore f ∉ D∗. If Λ1( f ) = 0 then Λ2( f ) ≤ 0 by
Equation (22). If Λ2( f ) < 0 then also E2( f ) < 0 by Lemma 22(ii)&(iv), and therefore f ∉
D∗. If we go on in this way, only two things can happen: either there is a first k for which
Λk( f ) < 0, and therefore also Ek( f ) < 0 by Lemma 22(ii)&(iv), whence therefore f ∉D∗.
Or we find that Λk( f ) ≤ 0, and therefore also Ek( f ) ≤ 0 by Lemma 22(ii)&(iv), for all
k ∈ {1, . . . ,ℓ}, whence again f ∉D∗. This shows that indeed A∩D∗ =∅.
For the converse implication, assume that 0 ∈ Cright({0}∪ A). We must prove that
there is some C˜ in C¯ that satisfies Axiom C5, DC˜ =D and 0 ∈ C˜({0}∪ A). We claim that
C˜ ∶= Cright does the job. Because we know by assumption that 0 ∈ Cright({0}∪ A), and
fromPropositions 11 and 3 thatCright is coherent and satisfies AxiomC5, it only remains
to prove that DCright = D . To this end, consider any f in L(X ) and recall the following
equivalences:
f ∈DCright ⇔ 0 ∈ Rright({0, f }) [Equation (11)]
⇔ (∀D′ ∈ D¯L)(D ⊆D′⇒ 0 ∈RD′({0, f })) [definition of inf]
⇔ (∀D′ ∈ D¯L)(D ⊆D′⇒ f ∈D′) [Proposition 10]
⇔ f ∈D , [Proposition 13 and Dˆ ⊆ D¯L]
which completes the proof. 
As a consequence of this result, we also have that, for any coherent set of desirable
options D ,
inf{C ∈ C¯ ∶C satisfies Axiom C5 andD ⊆DC} = inf{CD′ ∶D′ ∈ D¯L andD ⊆D′}.
6. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
One of the advantages of lexicographic probability systems is that they are more in-
formative than single probability measures, and that they allow us to deal with some of
the issues that arise when conditioning on sets of probability zero. This is also the under-
lying idea behind some imprecise probability models, such as sets of desirable gambles.
In this paper, we have investigated the connection between the two models, by means
of the more general theory of coherent choice functions. We have shown that lexico-
graphic probability systems correspond to the convexity axiom that was considered by
Seidenfeld et al. when considering choice functions on horse lotteries. The study of this
axiomhas led to the consideration of what we have called lexicographic sets of desirable
gambles.
In addition, we have also discussed the connection between our notion of coherent
choice functions on abstract vectors, and the earlier notion for horse lotteries, devel-
oped mostly by Seidenfeld et al. (2010). We have proved that by defining choice func-
tions on arbitary vector spaces—something which also proves useful when studying
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the implications of an indifference assessment (Van Camp et al., 2017)—we can include
choice functions on horse lotteries as a particular case. This allows us in particular to
formulate our results for that framework. Note, nevertheless, that there are some dif-
ferences between Seidenfeld et al.’s (2010) approach and ours, due to the rationality ax-
ioms considered and also to the fact that they deal with possibly infinite (but closed)
sets of options, whereas our model assumes that choices are always made between fi-
nite sets of alternatives. It would be interesting to investigate the extent to which our
results can be generalised to infinite option sets.
One of the advantages of Seidenfeld et al.’s (2010) approach is that it leads to a rep-
resentation theorem, in the sense that any coherent choice function can be obtained
as the infimum of an arbitrary family of more informative convex coherent choice func-
tions that essentially correspond to probabilitymass functions. Based on the results and
conclusions derived here, it seems natural to wonder if a similar result can be estab-
lished in our framework. Unfortunately, the answer to this question is negative: it turns
out that in addition to convexity we need another axiom, which we have called weak
Archimedeanity. With this extra axiom, at least for binary possibility spaces, it turns out
a similar representation result can be proved: every such choice function is an infimum
of its lexicographic dominating choice functions, showing the importance of a study of
lexicographic choice functions also from another angle of perspective. The observation
that we need an Archimedean axiom is in agreement with Seidenfeld et al.’s (2010) need
of their Archimedean axiom, which is—-unlike our weak Archimedeanity—difficult to
join with desirability. We intend to report on these results elsewhere.
On the other hand, we would also like to combine our results with the discussion
by Van Camp et al. (2017), and investigate indifference and conditioning for the special
case of lexicographic choice functions. In particular, this should allowus to link ourwork
with Blume et al.’s (1991) discussion of conditioning lexicographic probabilities. Finally,
it may be interesting to generalise our results in Section 5 to lexicographic probability
systems defined on infinite spaces.
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